The United States has been using special operations forces, covert agents, mercenaries and proxy armies to ght wars out of the public eye since the Cold War. By the time of the ‘war on terror’, these unconventional forces were being used alongside regular coalition military units in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
However, the recent and rapid development of new technologies and capabilities, as well as a lack of political appetite for large- scale military interventions, has led Western governments to embrace a ‘remote warfare’ strategy in today’s multiple and dispersed operations against jihadist networks. The recent shift away from ‘boots on the ground’ deployments towards light-footprint Western military interventions means Western forces often now work with and through local and regional forces, who undertake the bulk of the frontline ghting.
With the rise of Boko Haram, international support to Nigeria and its neighbours has increased, with the US, the UK, France, Russia and China providing training, equipment, intelligence and military aid.1 The evolution of the Boko Haram insurgency over 2017 presents an opportunity for re ection and evaluation. Analysis for this report shows that while the operations carried out by the Nigerian military, alongside its regional and international partners, have degraded Boko Haram, they have also encouraged the factional forces to metastasise, build resilience and craft new tactics to sustain ongoing political violence.
Den Bericht gibt's hier. (Sicherungskopie)